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Abstract	  
	  
In	  this	  article,	  I	  provide	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  problems	  associated	  with	  understanding	  
the	  nature	  of	  early	  autobiographical	  memory	  and	  discuss	  issues	  concerning	  the	  forgetting	  of	  
these	  memories	  (infantile/childhood	  amnesia).	  Specifically,	  I	  provide	  a	  brief	  exegesis	  as	  to	  
whether	  such	  memories	  are	  stored	  in	  a	  fragile	  manner	  to	  begin	  with,	  become	  difficult	  to	  
retrieve	  over	  time,	  or	  both.	  In	  order	  to	  answer	  this	  and	  other	  related	  questions,	  I	  review	  the	  
contribution	  of	  the	  articles	  in	  this	  special	  issue	  to	  understanding	  the	  enigma	  that	  is	  
infantile/childhood	  amnesia.	  I	  then	  outline	  some	  of	  the	  issues	  that	  remain	  and	  suggest	  a	  
functional	  approach	  to	  understanding	  why	  the	  forgetting	  of	  early	  experiences	  may	  be	  more	  
adaptive	  than	  remembering	  them.	  I	  conclude	  by	  suggesting	  that	  infantile	  amnesia	  may	  
actually	  begin	  during	  infancy	  itself.	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Unravelling	  the	  Nature	  of	  Early	  (Autobiographical)	  Memory	  
	  
	   For	  at	  least	  three	  centuries	  (Henri	  &	  Henri,	  1895;	  Miles,	  1895),	  and	  probably	  much	  
longer,	  students	  of	  memory	  have	  puzzled	  over	  the	  enigma	  of	  early	  childhood	  memory.	  
More	  specifically,	  although	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  young	  children	  can	  exhibit	  various	  rudimentary	  
forms	  of	  memory	  very	  early	  in	  life	  (see	  Bauer,	  2015;	  Howe,	  2011),	  researchers	  have	  
wondered	  when	  memory	  for	  events	  themselves	  becomes	  part	  of	  a	  child’s	  recollective	  
armamentum.	  Of	  course,	  children	  can	  remember	  events	  but	  with	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  
cognitive	  self	  at	  around	  18	  to	  24	  months	  of	  age,	  they	  now	  begin	  to	  remember	  these	  events	  
as	  experiences	  that	  happened	  to	  “me”	  –	  in	  other	  words,	  these	  memories	  are	  now	  
autobiographical	  (e.g.,	  Howe	  &	  Courage,	  1993,	  1997).	  	  
The	  importance	  of	  the	  self	  in	  autobiographical	  memory	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  its	  genesis	  
and	  early	  development,	  but	  is	  also	  key	  throughout	  the	  lifespan	  of	  an	  individual	  (e.g.,	  Bluck	  &	  
Alea,	  2008;	  Conway,	  2005;	  Prebble,	  Addis,	  &	  Tippett,	  2013).	  In	  fact,	  the	  mnemonic	  benefits	  
of	  self-­‐referencing	  and	  self-­‐generation	  (e.g.,	  Cunningham,	  Brebner,	  Quinn,	  &	  Turk,	  2014;	  
Mulligan	  &	  Lozito,	  2004)	  have	  been	  well	  established	  in	  both	  the	  child	  and	  adult	  memory	  
literatures	  for	  some	  time.	  Indeed,	  for	  some	  (Humphreys	  &	  Sui,	  2016;	  Sui	  &	  Humphreys,	  
2015),	  the	  self	  is	  the	  very	  “glue”	  that	  binds	  encoded	  elements	  together	  to	  create	  a	  strong	  
and	  durable	  trace	  for	  personal	  (autobiographical)	  experiences.	  	  
	   Importantly,	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  cognitive	  self	  creates	  a	  necessary	  although	  not	  
sufficient	  condition	  for	  the	  creation	  and	  retention	  of	  autobiographical	  memories.	  Indeed,	  
not	  only	  are	  scientists	  concerned	  about	  the	  emergence	  of	  autobiographical	  memory,	  but	  
also	  what	  happens	  to	  those	  memories	  over	  time.	  Although	  some	  have	  dated	  earliest	  
	   4	  
memories	  back	  to	  around	  the	  age	  of	  two	  years,	  the	  same	  time	  as	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  
cognitive	  self,	  most	  of	  our	  early	  memories	  become	  irretrievable	  later	  in	  childhood	  or	  by	  
early	  adulthood	  (see	  various	  articles	  in	  this	  special	  issue	  for	  examples).	  In	  fact,	  some	  prefer	  
to	  think	  of	  two	  periods	  of	  forgetting	  childhood	  events:	  a	  particularly	  dense	  amnesia	  for	  
memories	  up	  to	  the	  age	  of	  approximately	  two	  years	  (infantile	  amnesia)	  and	  another	  period	  
of	  not-­‐so-­‐dense	  amnesia	  lasting	  up	  to	  about	  five	  to	  seven	  years	  of	  age	  (childhood	  amnesia)	  
(e.g.,	  see	  Jack	  &	  Hayne,	  2010;	  Newcombe,	  Lloyd,	  &	  Ratliff,	  2007).	  	  
	   A	  key	  question	  concerns	  whether	  these	  amnesias	  are	  brought	  about	  by	  failures	  in	  
retrieval,	  failures	  in	  storage,	  or	  failures	  in	  both	  storage	  and	  retrieval.	  Concerning	  retrieval,	  
the	  basic	  argument	  goes	  like	  this:	  memories	  that	  are	  formed	  early	  in	  life	  are	  constrained	  by	  
the	  context	  in	  which	  they	  are	  encoded	  and	  although	  vestiges	  of	  these	  memories	  remain	  in	  
storage,	  they	  are	  difficult	  to	  retrieve	  unless	  one	  can	  reinstate	  the	  original	  (infant)	  context	  in	  
which	  they	  were	  stored	  (basically,	  an	  encoding	  specificity	  argument).	  Thus,	  although	  these	  
memories	  remain	  retrievable	  as	  long	  as	  the	  context	  can	  be	  reinstated,	  as	  the	  child	  is	  
developing	  rapidly,	  this	  context	  changes	  and	  the	  memories	  are	  no	  longer	  accessible	  (for	  
reviews,	  see	  Bauer,	  2015;	  Howe,	  2011).	  Concerning	  storage,	  the	  argument	  is	  that	  memories	  
that	  are	  formed	  early	  in	  life	  are	  fragile	  and	  hence,	  tend	  to	  be	  forgotten	  rapidly.	  The	  amnesia	  
problem	  emerges	  because	  memories	  that	  were	  formed	  early	  in	  life	  dissipate	  rapidly,	  
perhaps	  being	  replaced	  by	  newer	  memories.	  That	  is,	  early	  memories	  are	  no	  longer	  in	  
storage	  and	  thus,	  are	  not	  available	  for	  retrieval	  (e.g.,	  Alberini	  &	  Travaglia,	  2017).	  
	   Of	  course,	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  other	  weighty	  matters	  concerning	  how	  or	  even	  if	  
we	  remember	  early	  experiences.	  These	  include	  whether	  children	  and	  adults	  have	  rehearsed	  
and	  elaborated	  these	  experiences	  through	  conversations	  with	  others,	  something	  that	  raises	  
additional	  questions	  concerning	  whether	  what	  is	  being	  remember	  later	  on	  are	  the	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memories	  themselves	  or	  the	  discussions	  that	  ensued	  about	  those	  memories	  for	  early	  
experiences.	  Another	  critical	  question	  is	  exactly	  when	  does	  infantile	  and	  childhood	  amnesia	  
begin?	  Does	  it	  suddenly	  appear	  abruptly	  in	  late	  adolescence	  or	  early	  adulthood,	  or	  is	  it	  a	  
more	  continuous	  process	  that	  emerges	  in	  childhood	  and	  continues	  to	  develop	  into	  
adulthood?	  Finally,	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  individual	  and	  group	  differences	  questions	  
including	  whether	  variation	  in	  the	  ability	  to	  remember	  early	  experiences	  across	  cultures,	  as	  
a	  function	  of	  education,	  gender,	  or	  language	  skills	  contribute	  to	  one’s	  ability	  to	  remember	  
early	  experiences.	  The	  articles	  in	  this	  special	  issue	  all	  address	  various	  aspects	  of	  these	  
problems	  in	  early	  memory	  and	  in	  what	  follows,	  I	  provide	  a	  brief	  synopsis	  of	  these	  papers.	  I	  
then	  turn	  to	  a	  discussion	  of	  what	  we	  have	  learned	  from	  these	  (and	  other	  recent	  studies)	  and	  
suggest	  a	  number	  of	  questions	  that	  require	  further	  research	  in	  order	  to	  help	  resolve	  the	  
enigma	  that	  is	  infantile/childhood	  amnesia.	  
	  
ADULTS’	  RECALL	  AND	  DATING	  OF	  EARLY	  MEMORIES	  
	   Some	  of	  the	  articles	  in	  this	  special	  issue	  focus	  on	  the	  question	  of	  how	  accurately	  
adults	  date	  their	  early	  (or	  first)	  memories.	  For	  example,	  Wang	  et	  al.	  (this	  issue)	  found	  in	  two	  
experiments	  that	  North	  American	  college	  students’	  earliest	  memories	  could	  be	  dated	  as	  far	  
back	  as	  2.5	  years	  of	  age	  (consistent	  with	  the	  time	  the	  cognitive	  self	  emerges).	  Of	  course,	  this	  
age	  was	  calculated	  in	  part	  by	  removing	  what	  are	  known	  as	  telescoping	  errors,	  errors	  that	  
arise	  when	  dating	  early	  memories.	  Specifically,	  earlier	  memories	  tend	  to	  be	  postdated	  
because	  they	  are	  thought	  to	  have	  happened	  more	  recently	  than	  they	  actually	  have.	  	  	  
Ece,	  Demiray,	  and	  Gülgöz	  (this	  issue)	  conducted	  an	  online	  survey	  where	  participants	  
reported	  their	  earliest	  memories	  twice	  with	  an	  intervening	  two-­‐year	  interval.	  Interestingly,	  
they	  found	  a	  remarkable	  consistency	  in	  content,	  dating,	  and	  qualities	  of	  earliest	  memories	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being	  reported	  across	  this	  two-­‐year	  interval.	  However,	  such	  consistency	  was	  not	  observed	  
uniformly	  across	  all	  memories.	  Indeed,	  this	  consistency	  was	  seen	  primarily	  for	  the	  earliest	  of	  
childhood	  memories	  (those	  dated	  before	  48	  months	  of	  age).	  Perhaps	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  
early	  memories	  exhibit	  such	  consistency	  depends	  on	  how	  the	  data	  from	  adult	  recollection	  is	  
analysed.	  
Using	  a	  similar	  line	  of	  thought,	  Wessel,	  Schweig,	  and	  Huntjens	  (this	  issue)	  
investigated	  the	  malleability	  of	  dating	  earliest	  memories.	  Specifically,	  these	  researchers	  
examined	  undergraduate	  students’	  ability	  to	  date	  earliest	  memories	  by	  manipulating	  the	  
instructions	  prior	  to	  recall.	  Here,	  one	  type	  of	  instruction	  informed	  students	  that	  early	  
memories	  might	  be	  sketchy	  and	  fragmented	  and	  they	  were	  provided	  with	  some	  examples	  of	  
such	  memories.	  Instructions	  also	  included	  vignettes	  that	  referred	  either	  to	  events	  that	  
happened	  around	  the	  age	  of	  two	  years	  or	  events	  that	  happened	  later	  at	  age	  six	  years.	  As	  
predicted,	  age	  of	  the	  event	  memories	  mentioned	  in	  the	  instructions	  affected	  the	  age	  of	  the	  
earliest	  memories	  being	  recalled.	  As	  well,	  just	  thinking	  about	  events	  (self-­‐relevant	  or	  public)	  
that	  happened	  during	  their	  preschool	  years,	  also	  resulted	  in	  memories	  that	  were	  dated	  
earlier	  than	  when	  no	  such	  instruction	  is	  given.	  Thus,	  age	  information	  introduced	  in	  the	  
instructions	  to	  remember	  one’s	  earliest	  memories	  can	  affect	  the	  age	  estimates	  provided	  for	  
the	  memories	  that	  are	  retrieved.	  
These	  studies	  raise	  the	  issue	  as	  to	  how	  reliable	  age	  estimates	  are	  for	  early	  
memories?	  Indeed,	  what	  these	  studies	  suggest	  is	  that	  the	  search	  for	  the	  dating,	  or	  the	  
“when,”	  of	  early	  memory	  is	  fraught	  with	  problems,	  particular	  ones	  to	  do	  with	  
measurement.	  Of	  course,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  persnickety	  problems	  arises	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  
the	  “when”	  of	  a	  memory	  is	  not	  necessarily	  encoded	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  event.	  What	  this	  
means	  is	  that	  dating	  them	  at	  some	  later	  time	  amounts	  to	  a	  guestimate,	  one	  that	  may	  other	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faulty	  time	  estimates	  when	  we	  try	  to	  date	  related	  memories	  in	  order	  to	  date	  a	  target	  
memory	  (i.e.,	  when	  we	  estimate	  the	  date	  of	  our	  earliest	  memory	  based	  on	  memory	  for	  
other	  events).	  So	  in	  essence,	  the	  dating	  of	  earliest	  memories	  relies	  on	  processes	  that	  are	  
outside	  the	  realm	  of	  simple	  retrieval	  processes	  related	  to	  what	  is	  stored	  in	  memory	  –	  that	  is,	  
we	  are	  asking	  for	  judgements	  about	  things	  we	  have	  never	  stored	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  
To	  put	  a	  finer	  point	  on	  this,	  consider	  a	  recent	  study	  by	  Akhtar,	  Justice,	  Morrison,	  and	  
Conway	  (in	  press).	  They	  conducted	  a	  large-­‐scale	  online	  survey	  of	  people’s	  (6641	  
respondents)	  first	  memories,	  age-­‐at-­‐encoding,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  number	  of	  other	  memory	  
judgements.	  Consistent	  with	  most	  previous	  research,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  studies	  published	  in	  this	  
special	  issue,	  they	  found	  that	  age-­‐at-­‐encoding	  of	  earliest	  memories	  was	  3.2	  years	  of	  age	  on	  
average	  (uncorrected	  for	  telescoping	  errors).	  However,	  unlike	  many	  previous	  studies	  in	  
which	  there	  are	  few	  or	  no	  memories	  from	  the	  preverbal	  period	  (i.e.,	  prior	  to	  two	  years	  of	  
age),	  Akhtar	  et	  al.	  found	  that	  nearly	  40%	  of	  the	  sample	  (or	  2487	  people)	  had	  first	  memories	  
that	  were	  dated	  to	  an	  age	  of	  two	  years	  and	  earlier,	  with	  893	  (almost	  14%)	  dating	  their	  first	  
memories	  to	  the	  age	  of	  one	  year	  and	  younger.	  
So,	  if	  memories	  from	  this	  period	  are	  theoretically	  impossible	  (as	  most	  researchers	  
would	  agree),	  what	  accounts	  for	  this	  unusual	  frequency	  of	  very	  early	  (and	  improbable)	  
memories?	  Akhtar	  et	  al.	  (in	  press)	  examined	  a	  number	  of	  hypotheses	  (errors	  in	  dating	  
memories,	  potentially	  self-­‐selective	  nature	  of	  the	  respondents,	  and	  the	  narrative	  and	  
fictional	  nature	  of	  the	  “life	  story,”)	  and	  found	  all	  of	  them	  to	  be	  wanting.	  Instead,	  they	  
proposed	  that	  given	  that	  memories	  are	  constructive	  in	  nature,	  these	  recollections	  come	  
from	  a	  class	  of	  what	  they	  term,	  fictional	  memories.	  Specifically,	  because	  all	  memories	  are	  
time-­‐compressed	  and	  do	  not	  literally	  represent	  the	  experience	  from	  which	  they	  derive,	  
these	  very	  early	  memories,	  like	  other	  memories,	  contain	  details	  that	  are	  either	  consciously	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or	  non-­‐consciously	  inferred.	  In	  other	  words,	  fictional	  memories	  derive	  not	  from	  the	  reality	  
that	  was	  experienced,	  but	  rather	  from	  how	  well	  it	  corresponds	  with,	  and	  is	  coherent	  with,	  
other	  parts	  of	  autobiographical	  memory	  (also	  see	  Conway,	  2005	  and	  Conway,	  Loveday,	  &	  
Cole,	  2016	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  coherence	  and	  correspondence).	  The	  important	  point	  here	  is	  
that	  because	  memory	  is	  (re)constructive	  and	  can	  rely	  on	  many	  different	  sources	  (e.g.,	  
remnants	  of	  the	  experience	  itself,	  conversations	  about	  those	  experiences,	  accrued	  
[semantic-­‐autobiographical]	  knowledge	  about	  how	  the	  world	  works,	  coherence	  pressures	  in	  
autobiographical	  memory)	  when	  one	  is	  trying	  to	  retrieve	  a	  specific	  memory,	  the	  “when”	  of	  
such	  memories	  may	  be	  as	  impenetrable	  and	  unreliable	  as	  the	  very	  content	  of	  the	  memory	  
itself.	  
	  
CHILDREN’S	  RECALL	  AND	  DATING	  OF	  EARLY	  MEMORIES	  
Another	  strategy	  used	  by	  researchers	  to	  investigate	  questions	  about	  early	  childhood	  
memories	  in	  this	  special	  issue	  is	  that	  of	  examining	  early	  memories	  in	  children	  themselves.	  
Indeed,	  it	  has	  been	  known	  for	  some	  time	  now	  that	  amnesia	  for	  childhood	  events	  actually	  
begins	  in	  childhood	  not	  adulthood	  (e.g.,	  Bauer	  &	  Larkina,	  2014;	  Cleveland	  &	  Reese,	  2008;	  
Peterson,	  Grant,	  &	  Boland,	  2005;	  Tustin	  &	  Hayne,	  2010;	  Wang	  &	  Peterson,	  2014).	  Adding	  to	  
this	  line	  of	  inquiry	  in	  the	  current	  issue,	  Bauer	  and	  Larkina	  (this	  issue)	  examined	  the	  
development	  of	  autobiographical	  memory	  (rather	  than	  its	  absence)	  in	  4-­‐	  to	  10-­‐year-­‐olds	  
children.	  Using	  a	  cohort-­‐sequential	  design,	  they	  examined	  children’s	  autobiographical	  
narratives	  of	  events	  that	  had	  happened	  in	  the	  preceding	  four	  months.	  Each	  cohort	  (4-­‐,	  6-­‐,	  
and	  8-­‐year-­‐olds)	  was	  tested	  twice,	  separated	  by	  a	  one-­‐year	  interval	  between	  tests.	  For	  some	  
events,	  the	  child	  was	  interviewed	  by	  the	  experimenter	  and	  for	  others,	  interviews	  involved	  
both	  the	  mother	  and	  the	  child.	  These	  latter	  interviews	  were	  conducted	  in	  order	  to	  evaluate	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the	  influence	  of	  maternal	  narrative	  style,	  a	  variable	  thought	  to	  be	  important	  in	  the	  
development	  of	  older	  children’s	  ability	  to	  produce	  autobiographical	  narratives	  (e.g.,	  Fivush,	  
2014).	  	  
The	  results	  showed	  that	  the	  length	  of	  children’s	  autobiographical	  narratives	  
increased	  with	  age,	  a	  finding	  that	  is	  fairly	  typical	  in	  this	  area	  (e.g.,	  Fivush	  &	  Schwarzmueller,	  
1998).	  Of	  course,	  an	  increase	  in	  narrative	  length	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  the	  
memories	  themselves	  are	  any	  better,	  simply	  that	  there	  may	  be	  a	  growth	  in	  narrative	  
competence,	  something	  that	  affords	  an	  increase	  in	  verbal	  elaboration	  of	  what	  is	  in	  memory	  
(Howe,	  1998).	  Indeed,	  their	  results	  also	  showed	  that	  one	  of	  the	  better	  predictors	  of	  
children’s	  autobiographical	  narrative	  reports	  was	  change	  in	  children’s	  language	  ability.	  
Interestingly,	  maternal	  narrative	  style	  contributed	  little	  if	  anything	  to	  changes	  in	  children’s	  
autobiographical	  narratives.	  Perhaps	  most	  importantly,	  although	  narrative	  length	  increased	  
with	  age,	  the	  slowest	  variable	  to	  change	  was	  the	  thematic	  coherence	  of	  those	  narratives.	  
Thus,	  although	  children	  across	  the	  age	  range	  studied	  improved	  dramatically	  in	  narrative	  
competence,	  autobiographical	  narratives	  were	  neither	  as	  complete	  not	  thematically	  
coherent	  as	  those	  found	  for	  adults	  (similar	  outcomes	  have	  been	  obtained	  in	  cross-­‐sectional	  
studies	  as	  well;	  e.g.,	  Reese	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  
In	  a	  related	  prospective	  study	  in	  this	  special	  issue,	  Reese	  and	  Robertson	  (this	  issue)	  
examined	  childhood	  memories	  in	  adolescents	  (16-­‐year-­‐olds)	  that	  have	  been	  followed	  since	  
they	  were	  very	  young	  (1½	  years	  of	  age).	  In	  addition	  to	  assessing	  measures	  of	  early	  memory	  
at	  ages	  12	  and	  16	  years,	  they	  examined	  measures	  thought	  to	  be	  important	  in	  the	  
preservation	  of	  earliest	  memories.	  These	  included	  self-­‐awareness,	  attachment	  security,	  
nonverbal	  and	  verbal	  memory,	  language,	  theory	  of	  mind,	  narrative,	  and	  mothers’	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elaborative	  reminiscing	  which	  were	  measured	  during	  the	  early	  childhood	  phase	  of	  this	  
research	  (ages	  1½	  to	  5½	  years).	  	  
There	  were	  two	  key	  findings	  that	  emerged	  from	  this	  study.	  The	  first	  was	  that	  the	  age	  
of	  earliest	  memory	  was	  still	  changing	  during	  adolescence.	  That	  is,	  the	  majority	  of	  16-­‐year-­‐
olds’	  (73%)	  earliest	  memory	  was	  significantly	  later	  than	  their	  earliest	  memory	  when	  
measured	  at	  12	  years	  of	  age.	  Second,	  the	  link	  between	  the	  various	  measures	  taken	  between	  
the	  ages	  1½	  to	  5½	  years	  and	  earliest	  memories	  recalled	  at	  12	  and	  16	  years	  of	  age	  showed	  
that	  elaborative	  maternal	  reminiscing	  was	  critical	  to	  the	  ability	  to	  remember	  earlier	  
memories.	  However,	  by	  the	  age	  of	  16	  years,	  mothers’	  elaborative	  reminiscing	  was	  
important	  only	  for	  those	  children	  whose	  level	  of	  self-­‐awareness	  was	  lower	  at	  the	  age	  of	  19	  
months.	  	  
Although	  this	  research	  does	  not	  distinguish	  between	  forgetting	  and	  retrieval	  
explanations	  of	  infantile	  and	  childhood	  amnesia,	  it	  does	  tell	  us	  that	  one’s	  earliest	  memory	  
does	  tend	  to	  become	  later	  and	  later	  as	  we	  develop	  into	  our	  teenage	  years.	  These	  findings	  
from	  a	  longitudinal	  study	  dovetail	  nicely	  with	  other	  findings	  from	  similar	  studies	  (e.g.,	  
Peterson,	  Warren,	  &	  Short,	  2011)	  as	  well	  as	  with	  cross-­‐sectional	  research	  (e.g.,	  Tustin	  &	  
Hayne,	  2010).	  This	  work	  also	  confirms	  that	  one’s	  ability	  to	  remember	  early	  life	  events	  
involves	  a	  confluence	  of	  factors,	  including	  maternal	  elaborative	  reminiscing	  and	  self-­‐
awareness.	  
Another	  paper	  examined	  the	  role	  of	  mother-­‐child	  conversations	  in	  remembering	  
what	  happened	  in	  Kindergarten	  (Leichtman,	  Steiner,	  Pillemer,	  Camilleri,	  &	  Thomsen,	  this	  
issue).	  Here,	  mothers	  recorded	  their	  conversations	  with	  their	  5-­‐	  to	  6-­‐year-­‐old	  children	  
(Study	  1)	  and	  6-­‐	  to	  7-­‐year-­‐old	  children	  (Study	  2)	  about	  the	  child’s	  Kindergarten	  year	  and	  
another	  specific	  episode	  of	  their	  own	  choosing.	  Like	  other	  studies	  in	  this	  issue	  (and	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elsewhere	  in	  the	  literature),	  mothers’	  elaborative	  conversational	  style	  predicted	  children’s	  
memory	  contributions	  about	  all	  of	  the	  events	  being	  remembered.	  Of	  course,	  as	  the	  studies	  
just	  reviewed	  indicate,	  when	  other	  variables	  are	  measured	  simultaneously,	  parental	  
conversational	  style	  is	  not	  the	  only	  factor	  predicting	  children’s	  autobiographical	  memory	  for	  
their	  experiences.	  	  
Using	  a	  slightly	  different	  tact,	  Sonne,	  Kingo,	  Berntsen,	  and	  Krøjgaard	  (this	  issue)	  also	  
examined	  early	  memories	  in	  children	  and	  attempted	  to	  specifically	  address	  the	  question	  of	  
encoding	  specificity	  of	  those	  memories.	  Here,	  3½-­‐year-­‐old	  children	  were	  presented	  with	  
one	  of	  two	  unique	  events	  (i.e.,	  a	  “Teddy”	  event	  or	  a	  “Game”	  event)	  that	  were	  associated	  
with	  a	  one	  of	  two	  unique	  boxes	  (i.e.,	  a	  red	  metal	  box	  or	  a	  grey	  plastic	  box).	  Children	  
experienced	  an	  event	  in	  one	  room	  and	  then	  returned	  a	  week	  later	  and	  were	  tested	  for	  their	  
memory	  of	  the	  event	  either	  in	  the	  same	  room	  or	  a	  different	  one.	  The	  results	  showed	  that	  
changing	  the	  spatial	  context	  for	  retrieval	  (at	  least	  as	  implemented	  by	  changing	  rooms)	  did	  
not	  alter	  children’s	  ability	  to	  spontaneously	  retrieve	  the	  earlier	  experienced	  event.	  Of	  
course,	  this	  change	  was	  one	  of	  external	  context	  and	  perhaps	  amnesia	  for	  earlier	  
experienced	  events	  is	  more	  a	  matter	  of	  change	  in	  the	  internal	  (cognitive)	  context.	  
Interestingly,	  Tustin	  and	  Hayne	  (2010)	  have	  argued	  that	  differences	  in	  the	  dating	  of	  
early	  memories	  may	  arise	  due	  to	  correlated	  differences	  in	  what	  a	  person	  (child	  or	  adult)	  
considers	  to	  be	  the	  criteria	  for	  a	  memory,	  with	  these	  differences	  varying	  as	  a	  function	  of	  
culture,	  gender,	  and	  a	  number	  of	  other	  individual	  differences	  variables.	  In	  the	  current	  issue,	  
Tustin	  and	  Hayne	  (this	  issue)	  extend	  this	  line	  of	  argument	  and	  note	  that	  what	  we	  remember	  
from	  our	  earliest	  years	  may	  not	  actually	  reflect	  what	  was	  originally	  encoded	  about	  that	  
event	  as	  a	  child.	  Indeed,	  as	  adults,	  we	  may	  end	  up	  embellishing	  these	  memories	  when	  asked	  
to	  recall	  such	  information.	  In	  their	  experiment,	  they	  asked	  children,	  adolescents,	  and	  adults	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to	  remember	  events	  from	  different	  points	  in	  their	  lives.	  In	  this	  way,	  they	  could	  vary	  both	  the	  
age	  of	  the	  rememberer	  and	  the	  retention	  interval	  while	  keeping	  constant	  the	  age	  at	  the	  
time	  the	  event	  occurred.	  What	  they	  found	  was	  that	  adults	  not	  only	  provided	  the	  same	  
amount	  of	  information	  about	  past	  events	  regardless	  of	  when	  it	  happened,	  but	  they	  also	  
reported	  either	  the	  same	  amount	  or	  more	  information	  about	  memories	  from	  age	  5,	  10,	  and	  
13	  than	  did	  children	  of	  those	  same	  ages.	  Thus,	  in	  order	  to	  truly	  understand	  what	  early	  
memories	  are	  like,	  there	  may	  be	  some	  folly	  in	  asking	  adults	  to	  remember	  the	  past	  when	  it	  is	  
not	  tempered	  by	  examining	  what	  children	  encode	  and	  remember	  about	  those	  events	  in	  the	  
first	  place.	  
	  
INDIVIDUAL	  DIFFERENCES	  IN	  RECALLING	  EARLY	  MEMORIES	  
One	  individual	  difference	  factor	  that	  contributes	  to	  how	  far	  back	  one	  can	  remember	  
into	  one’s	  childhood,	  formal	  schooling,	  was	  examined	  by	  de	  la	  Mata	  et	  al.	  (this	  issue).	  These	  
authors	  examined	  the	  role	  of	  three	  levels	  of	  schooling	  (from	  rudimentary	  literacy	  to	  primary	  
school	  to	  formal	  university	  education)	  in	  the	  narration	  of	  childhood	  memories	  in	  Mexican	  
adults.	  They	  asked	  participants	  to	  provide	  oral	  narratives	  of	  three	  childhood	  memories	  (not	  
necessarily	  their	  earliest	  memory)	  and	  then	  analysed	  a	  number	  of	  factors	  related	  to	  these	  
narratives.	  As	  predicted,	  they	  found	  a	  positive	  correlation	  between	  extent	  of	  formal	  
education	  and	  the	  length,	  specificity,	  and	  self-­‐orientation	  of	  childhood	  memories.	  Clearly	  
these	  results	  show	  that	  sociocultural	  factors	  (in	  this	  case	  level	  of	  education)	  can	  play	  a	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OLD	  MEMORIES	  IN	  NEW	  BOTTLES:	  WHAT	  HAVE	  WE	  LEARNED?	  
So	  how	  far	  have	  we	  advanced	  over	  the	  last	  several	  centuries?	  It	  is	  clear	  from	  this	  
special	  issue	  that	  myriad	  developments	  contribute	  to	  a	  mature	  autobiographical	  memory	  
system.	  These	  include	  fundamental	  changes	  in	  cognitive	  (the	  self,	  language),	  social	  (e.g.,	  
conversations	  about	  the	  past	  with	  others),	  cultural,	  and	  formal	  educational	  components	  in	  a	  
child’s	  development.	  It	  is	  laudable	  that	  many	  current	  models	  of	  autobiographical	  memory	  
development	  incorporate	  multivariate	  theories	  that	  include	  self-­‐awareness,	  elaborate	  
reminiscence	  (with	  parents	  as	  well	  as	  peers),	  language	  and	  general	  memory	  development,	  
attachment	  factors,	  culture,	  and	  gender,	  among	  a	  number	  of	  others.	  Additional	  research	  on	  
other,	  related	  factors	  would	  be	  welcome	  as	  well.	  For	  example,	  examining	  the	  impact	  of	  
changes	  in	  self-­‐awareness	  throughout	  childhood,	  adolescence,	  and	  adulthood	  would	  
contribute	  greatly	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  dynamic	  link	  between	  the	  self	  and	  
autobiographical	  memory	  throughout	  the	  lifespan.	  Similarly,	  new	  research	  on	  the	  role	  that	  
stress	  and	  trauma	  can	  play	  on	  autobiographical	  memory	  would	  also	  be	  worthwhile	  as	  it	  
might	  dispel	  certain	  myths	  that	  early	  childhood	  stress	  and	  trauma	  make	  memories	  either	  
more	  or	  less	  susceptible	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  infantile	  amnesia.	  
We	  have	  also	  learned	  that	  infantile	  and	  childhood	  amnesia	  do	  not	  represent	  abrupt	  
transitions	  in	  memory,	  at	  least	  not	  at	  the	  behavioural	  level	  (but	  see	  later	  discussion	  
concerning	  neuroscience	  evidence).	  As	  reviewed	  here,	  and	  as	  seen	  in	  other	  recent	  articles,	  
evidence	  has	  accumulated	  that	  infantile	  amnesia	  begins	  early	  in	  childhood	  and	  continues	  
through	  adolescence	  and	  into	  adulthood.	  But	  now	  that	  we	  know	  this,	  why	  would	  early	  
memories	  be	  forgotten	  during	  childhood?	  Is	  it	  because	  they	  are	  no	  longer	  adaptive	  and	  
have	  been	  supplanted	  (modified,	  overwritten;	  also	  see	  Richardson	  &	  Hayne,	  2007)	  by	  newer	  
experiences	  that	  are	  more	  germane	  to	  our	  current	  needs?	  After	  all,	  what	  good	  is	  it	  to	  keep	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memories	  of	  the	  past	  when	  they	  are	  no	  longer	  functional,	  either	  in	  terms	  of	  our	  current	  or	  
future	  survival	  requirements,	  especially	  when	  memories	  of	  more	  recent	  experiences	  serve	  
us	  better?	  
	  
MORE	  QUESTIONS:	  WHERE	  DO	  WE	  GO	  FROM	  HERE?	  
Despite	  all	  of	  these	  advances	  in	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  development	  of	  
autobiographical	  memory,	  we	  have	  still	  not	  answered	  the	  basic	  question	  as	  to	  what	  
happens	  to	  our	  early	  memories	  and	  do	  they	  still	  affect	  our	  psychological	  development	  
across	  the	  lifespan	  even	  if	  we	  cannot	  consciously	  remember	  them?	  Moreover,	  are	  traumatic	  
experiences	  immune	  to	  infantile	  and	  childhood	  amnesia	  or	  do	  these	  memories	  also	  
succumb	  to	  the	  ravages	  of	  forgetting	  (whether	  storage-­‐based	  or	  retrieval-­‐based)?	  Finally,	  
are	  early	  memories	  simply	  poorly	  encoded	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  leading	  to	  more	  rapid	  
forgetting,	  or	  are	  they	  encoded	  just	  fine	  but	  become	  “trapped”	  and	  irretrievable	  due	  to	  
internal	  changes	  in	  one’s	  cognitive	  context?	  	  
First,	  concerning	  the	  latter	  storage-­‐retrieval	  issue,	  the	  evidence	  provided	  by	  
longitudinal	  studies,	  showing	  that	  with	  increasing	  age	  early	  memories	  appear	  to	  become	  
irretrievable,	  augers	  well	  for	  a	  retrieval	  interpretation	  of	  infantile	  and	  childhood	  amnesia.	  
However,	  such	  data	  do	  not	  completely	  rule	  out	  the	  idea	  that	  early	  memories	  are	  poorly	  and	  
incompletely	  encoded	  and	  stored	  and	  then	  simply	  fade	  into	  the	  background.	  Indeed,	  
evidence	  from	  adults	  recalling	  early	  memories	  suggests	  that	  these	  recollections	  are	  sparse	  
and	  fragmented	  (e.g.,	  Akhtar	  et	  al.,	  in	  press).	  Moreover,	  often	  what	  children	  remember	  of	  
early	  experiences	  is	  similarly	  sparse	  and	  fragmented,	  although,	  unlike	  adults,	  such	  findings	  
are	  constrained	  by	  relatively	  immature	  language	  and	  narrative	  skills.	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Second,	  concerning	  stress	  and	  trauma,	  although	  these	  issues	  were	  not	  dealt	  with	  
specifically	  in	  this	  special	  issue,	  there	  is	  evidence	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  early	  memory	  reports	  
do	  not	  involve	  emotional	  or	  traumatic	  events	  (e.g.,	  Akhtar	  et	  al.,	  in	  press;	  Bruce	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  
Indeed,	  painful	  and	  traumatic	  experiences	  early	  in	  life	  (e.g.,	  circumcision	  without	  
anesthetic)	  often	  do	  not	  translate	  into	  declarative	  memories	  for	  those	  experiences	  and	  
behavioural	  evidence	  of	  their	  persistence	  often	  dissipating	  within	  a	  relatively	  short	  period	  of	  
time	  (e.g.,	  see	  Taddio,	  Katz,	  Ilersich,	  &	  Koren,	  1997).	  Although	  there	  will	  no	  doubt	  be	  
exceptions	  to	  this	  pattern,	  depending	  perhaps	  on	  age	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  experience,	  it	  would	  
seem	  that	  for	  early-­‐life	  (before	  the	  age	  of	  two	  years)	  experiences,	  such	  memories,	  like	  other	  
early	  memories,	  are	  either	  very	  poorly	  encoded,	  forgotten	  rapidly,	  or	  both	  (for	  a	  review,	  see	  
Howe,	  2011).	  
Third,	  whether	  early	  experiences,	  consciously	  remembered	  or	  not,	  can	  still	  have	  an	  
impact	  on	  subsequent	  psychological	  development	  is	  still	  a	  matter	  for	  debate.	  Some	  have	  
argued	  that	  adverse	  early-­‐life	  experiences	  are	  associated	  with	  the	  development	  of	  
depression	  and	  anxiety-­‐related	  illnesses	  in	  adulthood	  in	  both	  humans	  (e.g.,	  Struber,	  Struber,	  
&	  Roth,	  2014)	  and	  non-­‐human	  primates	  (e.g.,	  Conti	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  It	  might	  seem	  from	  studies	  
such	  as	  these	  that	  regardless	  of	  whether	  one	  does	  or	  does	  not	  form	  a	  conscious,	  
autobiographical	  memory	  for	  these	  early	  experiences,	  adverse	  early	  events	  affect	  our	  
subsequent	  psychosocial	  development.	  However,	  interpretation	  of	  these	  outcomes	  must	  be	  
tempered	  by	  the	  fact	  that,	  at	  least	  in	  studies	  with	  humans,	  these	  conclusions	  are	  primarily	  
based	  on	  correlational	  not	  causal	  data.	  Although	  studies	  with	  non-­‐human	  animals	  can	  
involve	  experimental	  (potentially	  causal)	  manipulations,	  it	  is	  not	  always	  clear	  what	  the	  link	  is	  
between	  these	  various	  animals	  (primates,	  rats,	  mice)	  and	  humans.	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In	  what	  follows,	  I	  summarize	  some	  crucial	  recent	  findings	  that	  shed	  some	  additional	  
light	  on	  these	  questions	  and	  that	  suggest	  additional	  avenues	  of	  investigation.	  I	  begin	  with	  
some	  recent	  neuroscience	  research	  that	  addresses	  the	  storage-­‐retrieval	  question.	  I	  then	  
turn	  to	  a	  potentially	  new	  approach	  to	  asking	  questions	  about	  infantile	  and	  childhood	  
amnesia,	  namely,	  a	  functional/adaptive	  analysis	  of	  memory	  and	  forgetting.	  
	  
Recent	  Neuroscientific	  Evidence	  
To	  be	  blunt,	  the	  battle	  still	  rages	  on	  as	  to	  whether	  memories	  are	  still	  there	  but	  just	  
cannot	  be	  retrieved	  (Travaglia,	  Bisaz,	  Sweet,	  Blitzer,	  &	  Alberini,	  2016)	  or	  whether	  they	  fail	  to	  
store/consolidate	  in	  the	  first	  place	  (neurogenesis;	  Akers	  et	  al.,	  2014;	  Josselyn-­‐Frankland,	  
2012).	  For	  example,	  one	  recently	  examined	  neuroscientific	  mechanism	  (increased	  
neurogenesis	  during	  early	  infancy)	  has	  been	  suggested	  as	  a	  source	  of	  storage-­‐based	  
amnesia	  for	  early	  events.	  Here,	  given	  rapid	  neurogenesis	  (thought	  to	  be	  critical	  in	  the	  
formation	  of	  memories)	  that	  occurs	  during	  the	  infantile	  amnesia	  period,	  memories	  that	  are	  
formed	  during	  this	  time	  are	  subsequently	  erased	  or	  at	  least	  modified	  by	  additional	  
experiences	  so	  that	  they	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  retrieved.	  	  This	  explanation	  squares	  well	  with	  a	  
recently	  proposed	  cognitive,	  adaptive	  approach	  to	  memory	  whereby	  early	  memories	  are	  
blended	  with	  more	  recent	  experiences	  in	  order	  to	  form	  schemas	  that	  better	  represent	  the	  
world	  in	  which	  the	  young	  organism	  finds	  itself	  (for	  an	  overview,	  see	  Howe,	  2011).	  	  Although	  
these	  schemas	  provide	  for	  better	  organization	  of	  experiences	  of	  the	  past,	  allowing	  the	  
infant	  to	  interpret	  the	  present	  and	  anticipate	  the	  future,	  it	  comes	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  
remembering	  specific,	  individual	  experiences	  that	  took	  place	  early	  in	  life.	  
	   The	  idea	  of	  neurogenesis	  as	  a	  factor	  in	  both	  adult	  forgetting	  and	  infantile	  amnesia	  
certainly	  makes	  physiological	  sense.	  	  That	  is,	  new	  neurons	  overwrite	  old	  ones	  at	  memory	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sites	  and	  although	  this	  overwriting	  still	  preserves	  some	  of	  the	  structural	  features	  
corresponding	  to	  the	  original	  memory,	  it	  also	  substantially	  changes	  its	  contents	  (particularly	  
memory	  context).	  	  Importantly,	  however,	  although	  neurogenesis	  is	  high	  during	  the	  infantile	  
amnesia	  period,	  the	  fact	  that	  forgetting	  is	  also	  high	  may	  simply	  be	  correlational.	  	  I	  would	  
argue	  that	  there	  exists	  a	  preference	  to	  rewrite	  memories	  stored	  early	  in	  life	  with	  new,	  more	  
representative	  contemporaneous	  information	  as	  experience	  accrues.	  	  What	  the	  
neurogenesis	  data	  show	  is	  that	  while	  meaning	  may	  be	  preserved	  in	  traces	  that	  undergo	  
rapid	  change,	  the	  context	  of	  what	  is	  being	  learned	  is	  overwritten.	  	  These	  findings	  are	  
consistent	  with	  what	  we	  know	  at	  a	  cognitive	  level	  about	  how	  infant	  memory	  develops.	  	  
Once	  these	  early	  memories	  are	  better	  organized,	  perhaps	  through	  the	  development	  of	  
binding	  processes	  (e.g.,	  Olson	  &	  Newcombe,	  2014)	  that	  link	  the	  various	  features	  of	  events	  
(including	  with	  reference	  to	  an	  emerging	  self-­‐consciousness),	  they	  become	  more	  durable	  
and	  stable,	  and	  infantile	  amnesia	  wanes.	  	  	  
	  
Infantile	  and	  Childhood	  Amnesia	  as	  Adaptive	  Forgetting	  
There	  are	  myriad	  advantages	  to	  forgetting,	  both	  in	  childhood	  and	  adulthood.	  These	  
include	  emotional	  regulation,	  knowledge	  restructuring,	  automatization,	  and	  memory	  
updating,	  to	  name	  but	  a	  few	  (for	  a	  recent	  review,	  see	  Nørby,	  2015).	  Indeed,	  oftentimes	  we	  
may	  sacrifice	  specific	  episodic	  details	  of	  experiences	  in	  order	  to	  form	  semantic	  memories	  
about	  how	  things	  work	  in	  the	  world.	  For	  example,	  it	  is	  not	  necessary	  to	  remember	  every	  
time	  we	  tried	  to	  learn	  how	  to	  ride	  a	  bicycle	  to	  then	  ride	  a	  bicycle	  once	  learning	  has	  been	  
accomplished.	  
The	  theory	  just	  espoused	  concerning	  the	  forgetting	  of	  early	  memories	  is	  in	  line	  with	  
the	  recently	  advanced	  adaptive	  memory	  view	  in	  which	  early	  memories	  are	  particularly	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fragile	  as	  they	  are	  being	  reworked	  across	  multiple	  experiences	  to	  generate	  reliable	  
information	  structures	  that	  guide	  future	  behaviours.	  That	  is,	  earlier	  representations	  are	  
reshaped	  by	  new	  experiences,	  iterating	  toward	  a	  more	  viable	  worldview	  that	  promotes	  
accurate	  models	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  anticipate	  and	  deal	  with	  the	  current	  needs	  and	  future	  
demands	  (for	  an	  overview,	  see	  Howe,	  2011,	  2014,	  2015).	  After	  all,	  what	  would	  be	  the	  
purpose	  to	  remembering	  outdated	  information	  once	  it	  has	  been	  replaced	  by	  newer,	  more	  
recent	  (and	  ostensibly	  accurate)	  information?	  As	  Rovee-­‐Collier	  and	  Cuevas	  (2009,	  p.	  168)	  
noted,	  
	  
.	  .	  .	  at	  each	  point	  in	  development,	  infants	  of	  all	  species	  epitomize	  
a	  successful	  evolutionary	  adaptation	  .	  .	  .	  [where]	  they	  
rapidly	  learn	  the	  relationships	  that	  define	  their	  niche	  and	  confer	  
survival	  and	  reproductive	  advantage	  …	  .	  To	  meet	  each	  new	  
set	  of	  ecological	  demands,	  infants	  select	  aspects	  of	  episodes	  
to	  learn	  and	  remember	  until	  their	  niche	  changes	  again.	  
	  
Therefore,	  from	  a	  more	  functional	  perspective,	  rapid	  forgetting	  of	  early	  experiences	  
in	  light	  of	  more	  recent	  and	  diagnostic	  information	  may	  be	  a	  very	  adaptive	  mechanism.	  This	  
is	  particularly	  true	  during	  early	  infancy	  where	  one	  is	  learning	  about	  the	  world	  and	  trying	  to	  
form	  schemas	  (or	  other	  semantic	  devices)	  that	  allow	  the	  infant	  to	  survive	  in	  the	  
environment	  they	  find	  themselves.	  Indeed,	  more	  rapid	  forgetting	  early	  in	  life	  may	  promote	  
better	  adaptation	  to	  one’s	  surroundings.	  That	  is,	  early	  infant	  experiences	  may	  no	  longer	  be	  
relevant	  even	  in	  later	  infancy	  –	  knowing	  how	  to	  interact	  with	  objects	  when	  one	  can	  crawl	  
	   19	  
may	  no	  longer	  be	  relevant	  once	  one	  has	  learned	  to	  walk.	  Thus,	  infantile	  amnesia	  may	  start	  
during	  infancy	  itself!	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